belligerent approach of China across virtually all of its borders between 1962 and 1969. But, apart from the Cultural Revolution period, China has not had a disposition towards borders and sovereignty that has been all that different from that of other states (Watson 1966:19-20,212-3) . That is, except in one important respect. For China, the final chapter of national territorial unity has yet to be written. The civil war may be over, but for many in China national unity has not yet been restored. China is the only country in the world, and therefore the only major power, that is facing a serious 'secession' problem from a territorial entity with a large economy, powerful armed forces and global diplomatic representation (albeit unofficial). The decades of diplomacy and international noise that have surrounded Taiwan's international status have to a certain extent numbed outside observers to the true sensitivity of this fundamental consideration of China's nationhood. The resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 has created a new time pressure on leaders in Beijing to reunify China. However these pressures work out (and a peaceful settlement should not be excluded) the defining aspect of China's international relations is now, and will be for coming years, the approach taken by Taiwan to the question of China's national unity and dignity.
What marks out the 1990s as substantially different from the 1970s and 1980s is that China's leaders have begun to be far more conscious and far more defensive of the country's vulnerabilities on its periphery. This mood has been facilitated in some senses by a rise in China's physical capacity to control its borders as defined in a legal, technical sense but it has also been provoked by a growing sense of incapacity to contain and control threats in other dimensions. For China's leaders, the boundaries of their power-their international borders in both physical and social senses-are now facing multiple and intensifying threats. In some areas, the threat is one of legal, technical separation (as in Taiwan), while in others (such as Tibet and Xinjiang), the threat is seen only as one of resisting and repudiating the remit of the central state.
For 16 years , China was prepared to assign a lower priority to borders as a source of threat relative to a vision of borders as a source of opportunity, or even of economic necessity. As Chinese scholar Tianbao Zhu pOinted out in a recent article, Chinese leaders must now choose whether they will continue to accept that prioritisation (Zhu 2001) . They are being pushed in the direction of change both by rising nationalist conceptions of the country's borders and by an unambiguous and radical stepping up of international and domestic repudiation of the leadership's remit. As Jiang Zemin noted in the concluding four paragraphs of his report to the 16 th Communist Party Congress in November 2002, 'it is essential ... to bring about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation', a formula which he repeated one paragraph later, before noting in the third paragraph that China had to be 'keenly aware of the rigorous challenges brought about by the ever-sharpening international competition'.4 He noted earlier in the speech that 'uncertainties affecting peace and development are on the rise' and that 'hegemon ism and power politics have new manifestations'. And that the Party had faced a number of 'unexpected challenges bearing on China's sovereignty and security' since 1989. 
Geopolitics of the China periphery and the US political challenge
In Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, China's leaders have for many years seen themselves as facing threats to the country's national integrity and territorial sovereignty. Except at the most general level, these three problems have not really been linked either in concrete practicalities or in perceptions since the CIA abandoned its covert political agitation inside China some three decades ago. The specific circumstances ofTaiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang remain quite different and there has been little reason to see them as connected. But strategic policymakers in Beijing are beginning to see these once distinct problems as having new common threads that make them together a much higher order of security problem than any of the three cases had represented individually.
The Single most important thread in this evolving perception is the view that, since President George W. Bush came to power in January 2001 , the United States has been positioning itself to limit China's potential strategic power and has been using developments in these three areas to do that. Even to the non-specialist eye, this challenging trend in US policy has been relatively conspicuous in connection with Taiwan, especially in the rejuvenation of the US-Taiwan military relationship to levels unprecedented since 1979, and now little different from the alliance that was abandoned in that year.
But, as this chapter contends, it can be seen also in the cases of Tibet and Xinjiang, albeit in more complex or attenuated ways. The insertion into Central Asia in late 2001 of a potentially permanent US military presence can only magnify the vulnerability and risk that China feels in light of increased US military support for Taiwan. China's leaders do see the US military presence in Central Asia as positive in that it contributed to the removal of the Taliban, but they see it on balance as negative in that it will position the United States better to influence and challenge China's management of its internal affairs in Xinjiang. This reflects the essentially political nature of the new US challenge on China's periphery. And it is the political dimension that is evident in new US positioning on Tibet. There is no US military involvement in Tibetan 'separatism', nor is there likely to be much potential for such involvement. But China's leaders see even US political pressure on Tibet issues as gathering momentum, and as an intensification of US pressure on China as a whole for 'peaceful evolution' of China domestically and for containment of it on the international stage.
The evolution of US-China relations through 2002 has been sufficiently positive to dampen some of the more visible forms of tension between the two nations. In particular, the US need for China's support in Security Council votes on possible war with Iraq in late 2002 overshadowed and even contained some of the emerging negative trends in US-China security relations that were so visible in 2001. But this chapter contends that the underlying fundamentals remain negative. China's support for the US (and UK) position in the UN Security Council is based on shared values to some degree but is also part of China's strategy for responding to the new US strategic challenge that is emerging on its periphery.
The history of international relations shows convincingly that strategic pressure by one major power on another's periphery areas is a recipe for instability in international order. Where the power being subjected to pressure is a rising power, with not just a history but a historiography premised on recovery from national humiliation or fragmentation, the risk of strategic instability is even greater. This sort of consideration was prominent in the ideology of aggression advocated by the regimes in Germany and Japan prior to the Second World War. Thus, recent US positioning on each of the three problem areas arguably presents a new security challenge not just for China but for the international community as a whole. As a recent study from a US ally put it, our 'interest in a stable, cooperative, prosperous future for Asia is threatened by the possibility that America and China might drift into animosity or even war in coming years. The risk of this outcome is not high, but it is real and significant' ( 6 There are other statements by senior US officials that explicitly discuss the need to contain China's rising power. .. carrying out US carrier transits of the Taiwan Strait .. extending US-Japan mutual support arrangements for Korea-related and Chinarelated contingencies in the second half of the 1990s (Austin 1997) .. rejuvenating the military alliance with the Philippines during the Clinton Administration (Austin 2003) .. notifying of its intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty (this was not directed at China but is seen by it as a threat since it opens the way to develop theatre missile defence technologies which China suspects will be transferred to Taiwan). Beijing an issue of national integrity and internal security on almost the same level of complexity as the Taiwan problem. It should be noted that the main requirement from China's point of view in support of a temporary US presence in Central Asia at that time was an internal security one. China had to put aside its geo-political concerns in the interests of eliminating the threat of the export of revolution to Xinjiang from Afghanistan, Pakistan and some of the Central Asian states. China also no doubt saw virtue in being seen to be friendly to the United States in its moment of great need from the point of view of trying to make a dent in US public opinion. But now that the immediate threat of export of revolution has been reduced significantly, the geopolitical concerns will almost certainly begin to re-emerge. But in geopolitical terms, the fate of the SCO now seems to hang in the balance and the organisation will have to go through the next few years under competing pressures. On the one hand, leaders of all member states share China's very hardline approach to internal security and national unity. It would appear at first glance that they should easily be able to continue to cooperate on internal security matters.
But under the influence of the rapid and large scale US strategic insertion into Central Asia after 11 September, cleavages are beginning to show. Uzbekistan failed to attend the last SCO summit, and Russia made a dramatic strategic tilt towards the United States and Europe that can only compromise the embryonic strategic partnership that was emerging between China and Russia. The energy aspect of the Russian strategic tilt, embodied in President Putin's agreement to consult with the United States on oil prices, is one area where this may be felt most keenly by China. After 11 September, China is reported to have taken a decision to establish a strategic oil reserve, partly out of fear of an interruption of Persian Gulf supply, but partly out of concern about long-term access to Central Asian reserves. 
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: CHALLENGE WORLD ORDER OR SOFTEN ITS EDGES?
The circumstances analysed in this chapter raise big questions about future directions in Chinese strategic policy. Will these common threads to distinct periphery problems push China's leaders to a different strategic choice than the one they have accepted in the last two decades? Will they hold to the 1989 injunction of Deng Xiaoping of 'First, observing coolly; second, securing our position; third, dealing with things calmly'? (Austin 1998:239) . Can China make the domestic political adjustments Thus, in the normal logic of action and reaction in international affairs-as ironic as it seems-China is looking to influence peaceful change in the international security order because of the strategic pressure applied on it by the United States, especially over Taiwan, but in a positive way.
At a superficial level at least, this response seems to suggest that the neorealists and the 'China-threat' advocates might have been right. It does appear, at least at first glance, as though dealing with China from a position of strength has produced positive outcomes. But since the basis of the neo-realist assumption was China's power, not its weakness, something fundamental was wrong in their positioning. Moreover, the neo-realists had premised their argument largely on the need to discipline China and contain it within the eXisting international security order. They never quite imagined this more complete evolution, with China seeking to change that order by peaceful means. 15 A recent study of Xinjiang in the 1990s, albeit one based on fieldwork mostly conducted several years ago, supports the general thrust of the assessment this paper is suggesting, though it differs on some of the causes. The study by Nicholas Becquelin (2000:54, 90) concludes that the '1990s led to a very major shift in relations between the state and SOCiety in Xinjiang'. The system had changed, the author suggested, from one that discriminated (presumably positively) on the basis of nationality to one that segregated on the basis of nationality. The study identified major risks in Beijing's current strategy in the XUAR, and described the heightening of inter-ethnic conflicts-and in southern Xinjiang in particular, a renewed repressive climate and increased segregation. (The Becquelin study appears to differ from this paper in its emphasis on new Han migration into Xinjiang, whereas this paper has reported a net outflow of Han Chinese. Becquelin does note that 'information on recent Han arrivals is extremely difficult to verify'.)
16 See Seymour (2000) . Seymour notes that the Corps is a 'major institution for the ethnic Han and Uzbekistan. The negotiations built on significant progress that had been made between China and the USSR before 1991.
